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Abstract 
In this paper we consider why firms sometimes choose an external development path for their 
own inventions, despite the costs of contracting and the risks of opportunistic behaviour and 
expropriation. We model the probability that firms adopt an external development strategy 
using survey data from over 2700 Australian inventions. Our results indicate that firms pursue 
external development strategies in response to perceived project-level risk about the technical 
feasibility of the invention, especially when suported by confidence in the patent system. Our 
findings also confirm that small to medium size enterprises, highly leveraged large firms and 
firms with few co-specialized assets are more likely to pursue an external development 
strategy. 
 
JEL classification: O32, O33 
Keywords: Outsourcing R&D, managing technological risk, licensing innovation   3
1.  Introduction  
The transformation of an invention from the initial idea into a new commercial product can 
take place either wholly within one firm, or through a series of different firms, each 
contributing a different stage in the development pathway. In this paper, we aim to quantify 
factors determining this choice, focusing on the juncture between the identification of an 
invention and its subsequent development. From a theory-of-the-firm perspective, deciding to 
develop externally is puzzling given the advantages of scale, notably abnormal profits 
Griffiths et al. (2010), and the disadvantages of using external parties, notably contracting and 
transaction costs (Coase 1937), pernicious opportunistic behaviour (Williamson 1979) and 
expropriation of intellectual property (Arrow 1962).  
Our focus is on the role of project-specific risk and uncertainty, conditioned on the degree of 
IP protection. Our conjecture is that incorporating external parties into the development 
pathway is partly a response to owners’ uncertainty over the feasibility of the technology. As 
argued by Arrow and Lind (1970), risk-averse firms try to minimise the cost of uncertain risk 
(in contrast to actuarial risk) by spreading responsibility for the activity across multiple 
entities.
1 In this paper, we use survey measures of technological risk to assess their effect on 
the decision to develop externally. In so doing, we also control for two additional well-known 
determinants of “going external” – lack of liquidity and lack of complementary capabilities.  
To date, no studies have directly considered the role of project risk. Furthermore, those 
studies of the external development decision that exist have focussed either on a single 
industry (Kollmer and Dowling 2004);
2 university inventions (Shane 2001);
3 or start-ups 
receiving government support (Gans et al 2002).
4 The adjacent literature on licensing 
typically does not distinguish between licenses for mature versus developing technologies 
(e.g., Anand and Khanna 2000; Arora and Ceccagnoli 2006; Gambardella et al., 2007). 
                                                 
1 We presume that the risks associated with inventions will be weighted towards uncertain rather than actuarial 
risk since inventions are by definition something that is in essence something new. 
2 Kollmer and Dowling (2004) investigate a sample of 70 biotechnology firms.  
3 Shane (2001) considers the mode of exploitation of 1,397 patents assigned to the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology. However, since his analysis considers only patents assigned to a university (which is not generally 
in the business of commercializing inventions in house) the results are conditional on licensing being the mode 
of commercialization. 
4 Gans et al (2002) considers 118 small firms which either received VC funding or funding under a specific 
government programme.   4
However, the evidence is that most licensing activity involves mature technology (Kollmer & 
Dowling 2004; Anand and Khanna 2000). While existing studies have confirmed the 
influence of complementary assets, intellectual property protection and other market 
characteristics on the decision to ‘go external’, the role of project-level uncertainty remains 
unexamined. We extend the nascent existing literature by addressing this gap.  
Our estimations use invention-level data on 2600 Australian private-sector inventions. The 
core of the dataset is the population of patent applications filed at the Australian patent office 
between 1986 and 2005. The dataset used for the estimations was created by linking data from 
an inventor survey; company accounts; and technology-specific information from the US. We 
find support for the hypothesis that firms pursue an external development strategy in response 
to perceived technological risk. In addition, our results confirm that other more general 
sources of business risk, which cause liquidity-constraints and provide a premium for firms 
with complementary assets, are also influential. This is consistent with the well-known risks 
associated with highly leveraged positions and the separate and distinct risks associated with 
expanding capabilities.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section two discusses the relevant theory of the firm which 
identifies our principal hypothesis. Section 3 outlines our data and the empirical approach 
undertaken in this study. Our results are outlined in section 4 and section 5 concludes.  
2.  Background  
Why does a firm forego an opportunity for internal growth and instead engage and share 
returns with another firm? Early theories of firm boundaries typically held that internal 
expansion is preferred over external development.
5 
6 Internal expansion avoids many 
transaction costs (Coase 1937; Williamson 1979); facilitates the appropriation of project-level 
spillovers; and by diversifying the firm’s portfolio, can offer more options for within-firm risk 
                                                 
5 Many authors over time have articulated reasons for the superiority of large firms in developing new 
technologies. For a recent summary of the arguments, see Cohen (1995) and Symeonidis, (1996).  
6 We abstract from the inconsistent accounting treatment of in-house versus bought intangible assets and how 
this affects CEO incentives to buy rather than make, see He and Wang (2009).    5
management.
7 Added to this it is well-recognised that firms risk expropriation through 
copying when they incorporate external partners (Arrow 1963).  
While there are some advantages of being small and nimble (via focus, high-powered 
incentives and flexibility), large firms can opt for these advantages by operating as a holding 
company over a set of smaller self-governing subsidiaries (See for example, Rosenberg 1994 
and Branscomb and Auerswald 2001).
8 Small-firm advantages can therefore be mimicked by 
the large firm and it seems possible for large firms to access the ‘best of both worlds’. Static 
analysis does not reveal clear reasons for pursuing an external venture. 
The reasons for external development instead relate to the costs of expansion, not size per se. 
A firm’s propensity to pursue an external venture depends on the limits to its rate of internal 
growth, which we argue arise out of a firm’s willingness to bear and manage risk. Not only 
are there certain risks associated with the “normal” expansion of a firm, but these risks are 
aggravated when the expansion involves an R&D-based venture. Three types of risk exist, of 
which the first two have been comparatively well-researched. The first type is the financial 
risk firms take when they expand. Access to debt is limited by realisable collateral (i.e. 
owners’ capital) and the more leveraged the business, the greater the risk of bankruptcy. New 
capital raisings are also limited if owners want to minimise the risk of losing control (Kalecki 
1939; Carreira and Silva 2010). There is a view, and supporting evidence, that funding 
innovation via debt is particularly difficult because inventive and innovative activities 
typically produce uncertain and distant collateral which, more often than not, are absent from 
balance sheets (Schumpeter 1943; Hall 2005; Scellato 2007; Canepa and Stoneman 2008; 
Carreira and Silva 2010). 
The second type of risk is the uncertainty associated with successfully increasing the 
capabilities and skills of a firm (Penrose 1959; Brozen 1971; Demsetz 1973; Lippman and 
Rumelt 1982). External development may be preferred if there is a strong need for assured 
and rapid access to development capabilities or co-specialized assets (Richardson 1972; Teece 
                                                 
7 A contrary view is offered by Coase (1937) who proposed that “decreasing returns to the entrepreneur 
function” imposes a limit to the optimal firm size. 
8 Branscomb and Aueswald (2001) discuss attempts by Exxon Enterprises and IBM to develop small technology 
enterprises within their corporate umbrella. The authors suggest that, while affording innovating business units 
complete autonomy is desirable in theory, the temptation to intervene, monitor or support proves too strong to 
resist in practice.    6
1986; 1992; Cassiman and Ueda 2006).
9 External development strategies may be options 
when the inventing firm cannot quickly buy or copy the capabilities it lacks (Demsetz 1973; 
Lippman and Rumelt 1982). 
There have been a number of extensions to this basic idea. Teece (1986), for example, 
maintains that where technological change is rapid, a single firm, even a large firm, will be 
even less likely to possess the required technological expertise to bring a new technology 
completely to market. In addition, Chan, Nickerson and Owan (2007) argue that because co-
specialized assets involve considerable fixed (and sunk) costs, their economic price depends 
on the size of the internal pipe-line of inventions within the firm. Hence, a firm with a long 
pipe-line and fully utilized co-specialized assets will be inclined to seek additional support 
from external partners.  
It is however the last type of risk – project risk – has been least explored in the literature. 
Each project or activity carries its own individual risk over and above general firm-level risks. 
With respect to invention, these risks are largely uncertain risks since inventions embody a 
high degree of novelty. While pooling can be a successful strategy for projects subject to 
actuarial risk, Arrow and Lind (1970) have argued that the only effective strategy to minimise 
exposure to uncertain risk is to spread responsibility across multiple entities. As a corollary, 
we expect that firms will seek to contain their total exposure to uncertain risk by externalising 
the commercialisation process of the most risky inventions regardless of the status of their 
internal capabilities and their available funds for expansion. 
All the while, the firm still confronts the normal costs associated with using external parties 
for intangible transactions (contracting and transaction costs, opportunistic behaviour and 
expropriation). According to Richardson (1972), Arora and Ceccagnoli (2006), Chan, 
Nickerson and Owan (2007) and Novak and Stern (2008) confidence in the power of the 
patent system can be an enabling factor that affects whether firms use an external partner.  
                                                 
9 The importance of complementary assets in determining development and commercialization choices of 
inventing firms is supported by a growing body of evidence. Kollmer and Dowling (2004) find that among the 
70 biotechnology firms they analyse, licensing is a main commercialization strategy for firms which lack 
requisite complementary assets (‘non-integrated firms’). Similarly, Gans et al (2002) find some evidence that 
difficulty in acquiring complementary assets drives firms to cooperate with incumbents.    7
To summarise, the discussion above identifies three characteristics of the invention or its 
owner that will influence the probability that a given invention will be developed externally: 
the project-specific technological riskiness of the invention ; the owners’ collateral and access 
to liquidity; and the owners’ possession of co-specialized commercialisation skills and 
capabilities. Finally, confidence the owner has in their IP protection is anticipated to moderate 
the costs and risks associated with external development, thereby making it a more attractive 
proposition.  
3.  Survey Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The main data source for this study is the Australian Inventor Survey 2007, which involved 
sending a questionnaire to every Australian inventor who submitted a patent application to the 
Australian Patent Office between 1986 and 2005. The survey included questions relating to 
inventor- and technology-specific characteristics such as whether development was attempted 
(including proof-of-concept, testing and validation and prototype) and whether the invention 
was developed in-house, by an affiliate or by an external company. In addition, the 
questionnaire asked respondents to rate on a 1-7 Likert scale their assessment of the 
uncertainty they feel over the feasibility of the technology and their confidence that the legal 
system would prevent the invention from being copied. 
Every inventor listed on a patent application was sent a survey, with the proviso that inventors 
with multiple applications were limited to 5 randomly selected questionnaires. The inventor 
was surveyed rather than the assignee since we believed the inventor should have a more 
intimate and long-standing knowledge of the lifecycle of the invention than the owner(s) or 
their employees. Mattes, Stacey and Marinova (2006) found a high correlation (0.90) between 
inventor and owner responses in their survey of patent outcomes. 
Firm, or applicant (assignee), information was obtained by matching the applicant by name to 
the IBISWorld database, a private database which includes approximately 2000 of the largest 
firms in Australia.
10 Public-sector applications were removed from the dataset. Micro-
businesses were identified directly from patent records as non-company applicants. That is, 
following Gambardella et al (2007 p. 1169), we interpret assignment as to individuals as 
                                                 
10 The IBISWorld database covers the years 1989 to the present.   8
being akin to micro-firms, however, we confirm the robustness of our findings to a sample 
which excludes individual (non-firm) inventors. 
In total, there were 43,200 inventor-application pairs in the population which had a complete 
Australian address and inventor name.
11 These relate to 31,313 unique patent applications (i.e. 
inventions). On the basis of the number of surveys returned to us unopened (and two post-
enumeration surveys of non-respondents), we estimate that there were 5,446 inventions with 
valid addresses. We received completed questionnaires relating to 3,740 unique inventions, of 
which 3,271 were companies.
12  
The distribution of responses by technology area was: electricity and electronics (9.3 percent), 
instruments (11.4 percent), chemicals and pharmaceuticals (7.7 percent), process engineering 
(12.3 percent), mechanical engineering (29.8 percent) and “other” (29.5 percent). To gauge 
how technologically representative our sample is, we compare our sample with the population 
of US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) granted patents. This reveals that USPTO 
patents are more heavily weighted towards electricity and electronics and instruments and less 
towards mechanical engineering and “other” patents than our sample.  
Table 1: Technology Group of US Patent and Trademark Office and Australian Inventor Survey Respondents 
Technology group   Australian Inventor 
Survey 1986-2005 
(%) 
US Patent and Trade 
Mark Office 1986-2005 
(%) 
I   Electricity and electronics  9.3  30.4 
II  Instruments  11.4  16.9 
III Chemicals, pharmaceuticals  7.7  12.5 
IV Process engineering  12.3  12.1 
V  Mechanical engineering  29.8  19.4 
VI Other  29.5  8.8 
TOTAL  100.0  100.0 
Source: Australian Inventor Survey 2007 and NBER USPTO database, 1976-2006 from 
https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/Home. 
In order to consider any potential survey response bias, the survey population was compared 
with survey respondents according to the following characteristics: year of application; 
organisation type; whether the patent was granted (at the end of 2007); and technology area. 
A comparison of the patent application outcomes for survey respondents and non-respondents 
shows that more recent inventors where more likely to respond. Response rates also varied 
                                                 
11 8,413 applications did not have an inventor name and 37 did not have an address. 
12 More information on the population, sample and survey method is provided in the Appendix.   9
according to whether the inventor was employed by a large company (63.6 percent of those 
with an estimated valid address), SME (64.6 percent), public sector organisation (70.6 
percent), or filed as an individual (73.4 percent). Inventors whose applications were still 
pending were more likely to respond, followed by inventors whose applications were granted, 
rejected and withdrawn respectively.
13 The distribution of responses by technology area 
shows that there is a modest level of variation in the response rate across technology groups: 
there was a slightly lower response rate from the electricity and electronics area and “Other”. 




4.1  Dependent Variable 
Our dependent variable (denoted DevExternal) is a survey question which asks inventors: 
“Once this invention was conceived, was it developed in-house ( = 0) or by an affiliated 
organisation, an external organization under license, an external organisation under contract 
or other ( = 1)?”
14 In the regression sample, 21.0 percent of inventions were developed 
externally (but this falls to 12.4 percent if we exclude those developed by an affiliated 
organisation).  
As mentioned, we expect that the decision to develop externally is contingent on the size of 
the firm’s financial capital and its leverage position; its possession of co-specialized skills and 
capabilities; and the confidence it has that the patent will prevent copying. The conjecture of 
our paper is that, in addition to these established reasons, the invention’s technological risk 
profile is relevant. The construction of these explanatory variables are outlined below.  
                                                 
13 However, this is partly due to the fact that recent applications have not yet been examined. For applications 
lodged between 1989 and 2000, the response rate is 12.6 percent for non-grants and 18.6 percent for granted 
applications. 
14 We could alternatively define the dependent variable to exclude “developed by an affiliate organisation” but 
since the results with this alternate dependent variable did not materially differ from the DevExternal model and 
we limit ourselves to presenting results for the latter only.   10
4.2  Explanatory Variables 
Project risks. One of our key contributions is to consider the role of project specific risk. The 
survey asked inventors to assess the technological risk of the invention. The question was 
asked twice: once the development stage and again at the “make and sell” stage of innovation. 
Assessments were recorded on a 1 ( = “not a problem”) to 7 ( = “severe problem”) Likert 
scale. The variable used in the regressions, denoted as Technology Risk, are the means of 
responses at both stage for each invention. 
Financial capital and leverage. Large, unleveraged firms are least likely to be capital 
constrained, both in terms of external sources of capital and having more internal revenues 
available for funding development. We model these financial variables as a series of four 
binary variables, indicating a typology of firms. The first is SME =1 (=0 otherwise) if the firm 
has less than 200 employees and AUD$50 million total revenue. The second (denoted as 
Large-owner funds low) indicates if it is a large firm in the bottom third of IBISWorld owners’ 
funds for their 2-digit industry. The third (denoted by Large-high leverage) =1 (=0 otherwise) if 
it is a large firm in the top third of IBISWorld ratio of non-current liabilities to total assets for 
their 2-digit industry. Note that the second and third class are not mutually exclusive. The 
final group of firms, which is omitted from the regression model (and forms the base case) are 
large firms who are neither highly leveraged nor have low owner’s funds.
15  
Co-specialized skills & technologies. We have limited information on the organisational 
capabilities and co-specialized assets of the firms in our sample. However, we conjecture that 
both the firm’s patenting experience and the speed of change in the relevant technological 
field are correlated with their capacities for internal development. Specifically, we conjecture 
that (a) more experienced firms are more likely to have the resources to develop their 
inventions in-house; and (b) where technological change is rapid firms are more likely to 
outsource to supplement their own resources (essentially following Teece 1986). Two 
measures were included in the model. The first variable is the total number of domestic patent 
applications made by the firm (either parent or subsidiary) in the invention’s IPC subclass, 
prior to the patent application filing date.
16 Alternate specifications of the experience variable 
                                                 
15 In this dataset, 4.2 percent of large firms did not have financial data and these were included  in the base case 
of large unconstrained firms. The sensitivity of results to this allocation was assessed.  
16 To calculate this, we used the complete IP Australia administrative patent database from 1986.   11
according to whether past applications were aggregated at the OST or all technology levels. 
To capture ‘experience’ the log of the count of patents is used, which reduces the sensitivity 
to extremely large values. To capture the influence of the speed of technological change, we 
include a variable, denoted Technology cycle time, which is the median age of US patents cited 
in the same technology class over the period 1980-2001 (compiled by Chi research, see Narin 
1995; Kayal and  Waters 1999). An advantage of this measure is that it is exogenous from the 
Australian R&D environment.
17 Note that a higher cycle-time variable implies a slower rate 
of technological change so we expect this variable to be negatively related to the propensity 
for external development. 
IP confidence. Clear and (relatively) certain patent protection should moderate some 
concerns firms have about the contracting, opportunistic and expropriation costs caused by 
dealing with external partners. As above, respondents rated the confidence they had in the 
patent’s ability to prevent copying on a 1 ( = “severe problem”) to 7 ( = “not a problem”) 
Likert scale. These questions were asked twice: once at the development stage and again at 
the ‘make and sell’ stage of innovation. The model includes a measure (denoted as IP 
confidence) which is the mean of inventors’ responses pertaining to both stages.  
Table 2 presents a summary of the variables used in the regression according to whether the 
inventions were developed in-house or externally. It shows that overall, 6.4 percent of firms in 
the estimating sample were Large-owner funds low and 4.1 percent were Large-high leverage 
(note these categories are not mutually exclusive). 40.0 percent were SMEs and 44.1 were 
micro-businesses. The average number of cumulative past patents in the same IPC subclass 
for each firm was 8.8 and the mean age of backward citations in the related OST class was 
9.5. Both average felt technology risk (at 2.57) and average IP confidence (at 4.92) were 
closer to “not a problem” than “severe problem”. 
  
                                                 
17 Additionally, the data to construct this variable is not available from the Australian patent database.   12
Table 2 Summary of Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Regression Analysis (excludes micro-businesses) 
 
Mean value for 
developed In-house, 
N= 2,192 
Mean values for 
developed external,  
N= 435 
Mean values for full 
sample,  
N= 2,627 
Financial capital and leverage   
Large-owner funds low (%)  6.4 6.2 6.4 
Large-high leverage (%)  4.1 4.6 4.1 
Large-unclassified (%)  2.4 2.3 2.4 
SME (%)  39.1 45.1 40.0 
Micro-business (%)  44.5 42.1 44.1 
Co-specialized skills & technologies     
Experience subclass (no.)  9.0 7.8 8.8 
Technology cycletime (years)  9.6 9.4 9.5 
Project risks     
Technology risk (Likert scale 1…7)  2.51 2.87 2.57 
IP position     
IP confidence (Likert scale 1…7)  4.93 4.89 4.92 
 
Appendix contains details of exact question asked and summary statistics of the responses 
used in the regressions. 
In summary, the model we estimate using DevExternal as the dependent variable is represented 
as: 
                                                       
Where  X= Large-owner-funds-low, Large-high-leverage, SME, Micro-business; 
Y=Technology cycletime; W= Experience-subclass; Z=, Technology risk and IP Confidence, 
for each invention i in firm j and technology k. The coefficients are  , ,  and τ,  and    is the 
error term.  
4.3  Estimation and results 
The main estimation issue we have is that respondent’s responses regarding degree of felt 
project risk – Technology Risk– are likely to be moderated if development is pursued by an 
external firm that has a strong history of successful product development. Risk therefore is 
likely to be endogenous due to simultaneity.  
Fortunately, we have a promising candidate for an instrumental variable: the inventor’s 
assessment of importance of ‘science’ as a source of knowledge. The rationale is that 
inventors who draw more heavily on new basic science, such as academic literature and   13
university research, are more likely to be developing technologies that are subject to greater 
technological risk. The data come from the Inventor Survey which asked inventors to report 
the importance of eight different possible sources of knowledge to their most recent invention. 
In practice, our instrument consists of the unweighted average of the nominated importance of 
four ‘basic science’ sources including universities and scientific literature.
18 While we believe 
our choice of instrument is based on sound a priori reasoning, we also undertake a range of 
statistical tests to confirm the validity of our instrument.  
OLS estimates of our model are presented in column (1) of Table 3. The IV linear probability 
model is presented in column 2 and the IV probit is presented in column 3. Not only are the 
linear IV results consistent estimates of local average “treatment” effect (of felt risk) (Angrist 
and Kreuger 2001) but the coefficients are straightforward to interpret and linear IV allows 
for a range of statistical diagnostics not available in IV probit (such as regarding weak 
instruments). These diagnostics, discussed below, support the validity of the instrument.  
To begin with we note that the OLS results presented in column 1 indicate a significant 
correlation between project-specific technical risk and external development (the estimated 
coefficient is 0.0212). However, as discussed, we are concerned that the act of external 
development might allay inventors concerns regarding technical risk and thereby mask the 
true magnitude of the hypothesised relationship. This suspicion is confirmed by a Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test (over 24), which strongly rejects the null that perceived technological risk is 
exogenous. IV estimates, which account for the masking effect, are presented in column (2). 
Further confirming our hypothesis, the IV estimates of the relationship between project risk 
and the decision to develop externally is an order of magnitude greater than those estimated 
using OLS (c.f., 0.0212 from column 1 and 0.221 from column 2). 
The validity of our instrument is investigated using a range of approaches, suggested by 
Angrist and Pischeke (2009). First, since IV estimates are consistent but not unbiased, it is 
important to consider the potential magnitude of this bias, which depends primarily on the 
strength (and number) of chosen instrument(s). The first-stage F-test (=34.50), presented in 
                                                 
18 The eight categories include: (1) Universities, (2) Other public sector research bodies, (3) Technical 
conferences and workshops, (4) Scientific literature, (5) Patent literature, (6) Customers or product users, (7) 
Suppliers and; (8) Competitors. Factor analysis confirmed that these fall naturally into two groups (1-4) which 
we associate with science and ‘push factors’ and (5-8) which are associated with market factors or demand.   14
the penultimate row of Table 3, indicates that the instrument Science, is closely correlated 
with the endogenous variable. The first stage regression results are presented in Table A6 in 
the appendix. The significance of our instrument was also confirmed in a reduced-form 
regression of DevExternal on the instrument in place of the endogenous variable (presented in 
Table A7, column 1 in the appendix). Finally, we note that the bias in the estimated 
coefficient of two-stage least squares is approximately zero where the equation is just 
identified, that is, in our case when we have only one instrument (Angrist and Kreuger 2001). 
Table 3 Regression estimates: Dependent variable = DevExternal 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
  OLS  Linear IV  IV Probit  Marginal effects 
from (3) 
VARIABLES     (0/1 – discrete 
variables; µ-σ/µ-σ – 
continuous variables) 
Financial capital and liquidity      
Large- owner funds low  0.0443 0.00402  0.0690 0.018 
  (0.0413) (0.0545) (0.155)   
Large-high leverage  0.101** 0.121** 0.365** 0.098 
  (0.0451) (0.0573) (0.166)   
SME  0.0659*  0.140*** 0.404*** 0.102 
  (0.0384) (0.0482) (0.142)   
Micro-business  0.0357  0.159*** 0.447*** 0.112 
  (0.0418) (0.0583) (0.151)   
Co-specialized skills & technologies      
Ln(Experiencesubclass)  -0.0192**  -0.0331*** -0.0856*** -0.051 
  (0.00897) (0.0121)  (0.0313)   
Ln(Technology cycle time)  -0.101***  -0.109** -0.264** -0.025 
  (0.0371) (0.0509) (0.129)   
Project risks      
Technology risk                          (instrumented)  0.0212***  0.221*** 0.532*** 0.525 
  (0.00445) (0.0508)  (0.0423)   
IP position      
IP confidence  0.00336  0.0408*** 0.0979*** 0.096 
  (0.00376) (0.0110)  (0.0150)   
       
Constant  0.286*** -0.468**  -2.213***   
  (0.0973) (0.226)  (0.350)   
F test (tech_rsk)   34.50     
Observations  2,702 2,627 2,627   
 
The second requisite attribute of a valid instrument is that it is uncorrelated with our 
dependent variable (except through the variable it is instrumenting). While we believe the a   15
priori case that Science is exogenous is well founded, we would like additional statistical 
reassurance. To test over-identification, we employed two additional instruments. The first is 
the average risk for each OST technology class;
19 and second is a dummy variable which 
indicates whether the invention was radical (versus incremental) relative to the state-of-the-
art. Both variables were obtained from the Inventor Survey. We argue that these instruments 
should be uncorrelated with external development except via their correlation with project 
specific risk. While Average risk and Radical are not our preferred instruments, they allow us to 
use the over-identification test to support to our original choice of instrument. The Hansen-J 
statistic (over-identification test), which is reported in Table A7, column 2 in the appendix, 
has a P-value = 0.1823. This means we cannot reject the hypothesis that the instruments are 
valid (i.e., that our preferred instrument Science is exogenous).  
Column 3 presents IV Probit estimates of the same model, employing Science as the sole 
instrument of Technical risk. The probit estimator avoids the out of range predictions and is 
more efficient if the distributional assumptions are correct. The IV Probit estimates are 
consistent with the linear IV.  
Our key hypothesis is that project level uncertainty about the feasibility of the technology is 
an important influence in determining a firm’s decision to pursue external development. In 
addition to the careful assessment regarding the validity of our identification strategy we 
undertook a range of other robustness testing. While our preferred results include patents 
assigned to micro-firms, we test the robustness of these results to a sample excluding patents 
assigned to individuals and find little difference in the estimates (presented in Table A7, 
column 3 in the appendix). In fact, the relationship is also robust to firm-level fixed effects,
20 
that is, a statistically significant relationship between project risk and external development 
can be observed within a firm’s portfolio of projects.  
Our estimates also provide evidence on other determinants of a firm’s decision to pursue an 
external development pathway. We find that Large-high  leverage and SME variables are 
significant and positive, indicating that more leveraged firms (relative to their industry 
                                                 
19 Using a grouped within sample variable is a method used by Daniela Del Boca in labor economics. 
20 In this case IV was not an option because our instrument (‘science’) is collected at the inventor level, which 
corresponds to a considerable degree to the firm level, and is therefore unable to identify variation from the firm 
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average) were significantly more likely to develop externally. This result was robust across all 
specifications. While the role of liquidity constraints in the external development decision has 
been subject to some empirical scrutiny, this evidence is novel in that it is based on a large 
systematic sample. Recall that the excluded category is large firms which are neither highly 
leveraged or in the category of having low shareholder funds. 
Both of the variables representing Co-specialized skills and technologies and Technology cycle time 
are significant and correctly signed. Firms with either less accumulated experience in 
patenting in the same subclass or producing inventions in fast changing technologies were 
more likely to develop externally. In unreported results, we also included a variable reflecting 
whether the firm’s primary technological focus is in the same area as the given patent. 
Specifically, the ratio of experience in the given subclass to all experience (cumulative 
patents). This variable was never significant in any specification. 
IP confidence is significant and also exhibits the anticipated sign. That is, the more confident 
the firm is, the more likely it is to use or seek an external development partner. We expect IP 
confidence to have an interactive effect with the other explanatory variables, that is, without 
strong IP protection, firms will typically not pursue external development even in the face of 
other factors which may encourage it.  
As an extension to the above analysis, we consider this interactive affect using two 
approaches. First, we estimate a model which incorporates the degree of felt risk interacted 
with confidence over IP position. Results are presented in column 1 of Table 4 and these 
confirm a statistically significant positive interactive effect indicating that Technology risk has a 
greater impact when confidence in the intellectual property system is high. To allow for the 
possibility that other parameters may also vary with IP confidence, we divided the sample in 
half into firms which indicated that they had less confidence in IP protection and those which 
had more. The division approximately balanced the numbers of observations in each group. 
This sample splitting approach avoids the high demands of multiple interacted terms (i.e., a 
nested model). Results on the split sample, which are presented in Table 4 column 2, show 
that the coefficient for technological risk is higher the greater the degree of confidence in IP. 
The statistical significance of some other coefficients was sensitive to the number of 
observations in each group.    17
The simulated marginal effects presented in Table 3 are based on full-sample IV Probit. These 
effects can be compared to indicate the economic importance of the independent variables, as 
distinct from their statistical importance. The binary Financial capital and liquidity variables 
are evaluated at 0 or 1, while the continuous Co-specialised skills and technologies, Project 
risks and IP Position variables are evaluated at one standard deviation below and one standard 
deviation above the mean. Column 4 shows that the variation in the degree of felt 
technological risk has the largest impact on whether or not the inventing firm decides to 
develop externally. Being a micro-business, SME or highly leverage large firm all have a 
comparable effect on the probability of developing externally relative to other large firms.  
Table 4: Regression estimates, split sample: Dependent variable = DevExternal IV Probit 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  IV Probit  IV Probit  IV Probit 
VARIABLES  Full sample   Less confident 
about IP 
More confident 
about IP  
Financial capital and liquidity     
Large-owner funds low  -0.000 0.00389  -0.00273 
  (0.0582) (0.0762) (0.0778) 
Large-high leverage  0.113* 0.154* 0.0629 
  (0.0603) (0.0869) (0.0824) 
SME  0.149*** 0.0549  0.186*** 
  (0.0516) (0.0697) (0.0652) 
Micro-business  0.174*** 0.0608  0.188** 
  (0.0625) (0.0773) (0.0806) 
Co-specialized skills & technologies     
Ln(Experiencesubclass)  -0.0329*** -0.0547*** -0.0177 
  (0.0124) (0.0160) (0.0160) 
Ln(Technology cycle time)  -0.106** -0.143** -0.0601 
  (0.0517) (0.0693) (0.0716) 
Project risks     
Technology risk*IP Confidence     (instrumented)  0.0166***    
  (0.00446)    
Technology risk                              (instrumented)  0.150*** 0.149*** 0.272*** 
  (0.0352) (0.0499) (0.0835) 
     
Constant  -0.301 0.0286  -0.465* 
  (0.193) (0.227) (0.270) 
     
F test (tech_rsk)  72.09 21.42 19.20 
Observations  2,627 1,287 1,431 
Cases     
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5.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we test whether firms limit their internal growth in order to share uncertain risk 
with other entities using a dataset of 2700 inventions. In so doing, we revisit one of the classic 
questions of industrial economics – what determines the boundary of the firm? Our evidence 
supports the view that using external partners is one way firms spread the risk associated with 
uncertain technologies. In addition, we found new systematic evidence confirming the widely 
held belief that external development is often undertaken in response to liquidity constraints. 
Finally, the important role of the IP system in facilitating external development was 
confirmed, most notably in that firms are more likely to act on underlying need to pursue 
external development where they are confident in their IP protection.  
Prior studies on the determinants of the vertical disaggregation of the commercialization 
pathway have focused on firm-level capacities and specialization and expropriation risk. In 
this paper, we find that, once these factors are controlled for, managing project level risk is a 
key driver and advantage of external development. Confidence in IP rights enables firms to 
optimally allocate risk between partners.  
Our results also highlight that opportunities lost through liquidity constraints and a shortage 
of internal capabilities may be diminished by a smooth functioning market for technology. An 
IP system which provides clarity and certainty is important in facilitating the optimal 
industrial structure of innovative industries.  
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Appendix: Australian Inventor Survey 
The Australian Inventor Survey was mailed out in two waves between July and December 
2007 by researchers at the Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, 
University of Melbourne. The recipients of the survey constituted the population of Australian 
inventors who filed a patent application at the Australian Patent office – IP Australia – during 
the period 1986-2005. The survey recipients were identified by the country of applicant 
(Australia) and their postal address.  
The inventor-invention relationship is a many-to-many relationship. That is, one inventor can 
have many patent applications, and one patent application can have many inventors. In total, 
there were 43,200 inventor-application pairs in the population with a complete inventor name 
and Australian address.
21 Of the 31,313 applications, 76.2 percent had only one inventor and 
almost all (99.3 percent) had 5 or less inventors. Of the 31,947 inventors, the vast majority 
(82.5 percent) had only filed one application between 1986 and 2005. To avoid administrative 
burden, inventors were asked about each invention, up to a maximum of 5 patent applications.  
There was no initial screening of survey recipients and 47.0 percent of surveys were returned 
to us (as “return to sender”) unopened, presumably because the address was no longer valid. 
To estimate the number of non-responses which also had invalid addresses, we selected a 
random sample of 600 non-respondents (both those from the “return to sender” and “no 
response” groups) and manually looked the applicant up by name and address in both the 
telephone book and internet. People with a valid telephone number were then called to 
confirm that they were the correct person. This search revealed that only 11.7 percent of the 
sample of non-respondents had a complete address and were still at the listed address (some 
had moved while others had apparently disappeared). Assuming that this is representative of 
all non-respondents, we can infer that we had a valid inventor address for 5,446 of our 
original population of inventions. We received completed questionnaires for 3,740 inventions.  
The following four tables show the pattern of survey response by year of application across 
various characteristics.  
  
                                                 
21 8413 applications did not have an inventor name and 37 did not have an address.   20
 
Table A1: Number of Patent Applications with a Complete Survey Response by Year, 1986-2005 
Year  Number of patent applications 
 Complete  Est. address valid
a 
& not complete 
Est. address not 
valid   Total 
1986-1990  254   245  3,705  4,204 
1991-1995  554   385  5,831  6,770 
1996-2000  1,125 541  8,186  9,852 
2001-2005  1,807 537  8,143  10,487 
Total  3,740  1,708 25,865  31,313 
Note: 
a Excludes surveys that were returned as ‘return to sender’ and the estimated 88.3% of non-responses which we 
estimated, through a post-enumeration survey, to have had an invalid address. 
 
 
Table A2: Number of Patent Applications with a Complete Survey Response by Organization Type, 1986-2005 





& not complete 




b  588 (63.6%)  337  5,097  6,022 
SME
b  1,175 (64.6%)  643  9,727  11,545 
Public sector research  269 (70.6%)  112  1,697  2,078 
Individual  1,704 (73.4%)  618  9,346  11,668 
Total  3,736 (68.6%)  1,710  25,867  31,313 
Notes: 
a Excludes surveys that were returned as ‘return to sender’ and the estimated 88.3% of non-responses which we estimated, 
though a post-enumeration survey to have had an invalid address. 
b A company is ‘Large’ where it, or its highest Australian-located 
parent company, has a turnover greater than A$50m per annum. Otherwise the company is defined as an SME. 
 
Table A3: Number of Patent Applications with a Complete Survey Response by Patent Application Outcome, 1986-
2005 




a  & not 
complete 
Est. address not 
valid  Total 
Withdrawn 572  331  5,006  5,909 
Pending 731  167  2,535  3,433 
Rejected 382  232  3,512  4,126 
Granted 2,051  979  14,815  17,845 
Total 3,736  1,710  25,867  31,313 
Note: 
a Excludes surveys that were returned as ‘return to sender’ and the estimated 88.3% of non-responses which we 
estimated, though a post-enumeration survey to have had an invalid address. 
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Table A4: Number of Patent Applications with a Complete Survey Response by Technology Area, 1986-2005 
OST technology area
b  Number of patent applications 
 Complete  Est.  address 
valid
a  & not 
complete 
Est. address not 
valid 
Total 
I Electricity and electronics  329 181  2,739  3,249 
II Instruments  440 175  2,654  3,269 
III Chemicals, pharmaceuticals  410 166  2,516  3,092 
IV Process engineering  447 187  2,825  3,459 
V Mechanical engineering  1,061 476  7,204  8,741 
VI “Other”  1,048 524  7,927  9,499 
Total  3,736 1,710  25,867  31,313 
Notes: 
a Excludes surveys that were returned as ‘return to sender’ and the estimated 88.3% of non-responses which we 
estimated, though a post-enumeration survey to have had an invalid address. 
b OST refers to the Office of Science and 
Technology classification which is based on the International Patent Classification system  
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Table A5: Summary of Descriptive Statistics for Variables used in Regression Analysis 
Variable  Concept   Measure/survey question  Source  Mea
n  
SD  
DevExternal  Invention 
developed by an 
external partner 
Once the invention had been conceived, 
was it developed…In-house, By 
affiliated organisation, By external 
organisation under license, By external 





Large firm with 
few mortgagable 
assets. 
Large firm (>$50m turnover pa). 
Owner funds in bottom third of 2-digit 




Large firm highly 
leveraged 
Large firm (>$50m turnover pa). 
Owner funds in top third of 2-digit 
industry mean. Deflated by CPI. 
IBISWorld 0.075 0.263
SME  Small and medium 
enterprise 
Not large, micro business or pubic 
research organisation. 
Default 0.715 0.451
Experiencesubclass  Firm’s experience 
commercialising 
patents 
The inverse of the cumulative number 
of Australian patent applications by 









The inverse of the median age of the 
backward citations on US patents in the 
same OST technology as the invention 




Technology risk  Uncertainty over 
technology  
How severe were the following 
problems in the development & make 
and sell stages…Uncertainty over 
feasibility of technology (rated on two 7 
point Likert scales, 7 is most uncertain). 
AIS-2007 2.716 1.634
IP confidence  Confidence in IP  How severe were the following 
problems in the development & make 
and sell stages… Lack of confidence in 
legal protection from copying of the 
invention (rated on two 7 point Likert 
scales, 1 is least confident). 
AIS-2007 5.19 1.806






Mean Technology risk for OST 
technology relating to the invention.  
AIS-2007 2.641 0.278
Science  Riskiness of 
invention 
How important were the following 
sources of knowledge for research on 
your last patent application? 
Universities, other public sector 
research bodies, technical conferences 
and workshops and scientific literature 
(mean of ratings on four 7 point Likert 
scales). 
AIS-2007 2.730 1.505




Relative to state of art at time of 
application, did the invention reflect 
…an Incremental improvement, Radical 
improvement, Unsure. 
AIS-2007 0.578 0.494
Note: AIS-2007 is the Australian Inventor Survey 2007. 
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Table A6: First stage regression estimates for estimation (2) Table 3: Dependent variable = Technology risk  
  (1) 
  First stage Linear IV 
VARIABLES  Full sample  
Financial capital and liquidity   
Large-owner funds low  0.215 
  (0.188) 
Large-high leverage  -0.050 
  (0.190) 
SME  -0.342** 
  (0.157) 
Micro-business  -0.572*** 
  (0.171) 
Co-specialized skills & technologies   
Ln(Experiencesubclass)  0.052 
  (0.038) 
Ln(Technology cycle time)  0.124 
  (0.156) 
Instruments   
Science  0.133*** 
  (0.023) 
IP position   
IP Confidence  -0.187*** 
  (0.017) 
Constant  3.215 
  (0.409) 
   
F(  8,  2618)  30.30 
Observations  2,627 
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Table A7 Supplementary regression estimates: Dependent variable = DevExternal 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 








Financial capital and liquidity        
Large- owner funds low  0.0511 0.0116  -0.0125   
  (0.0414) (0.0498)  (0.0654)   
Large-high leverage  0.110** 0.117**  0.128*   
  (0.0451) (0.0537)  (0.0660)   
SME  0.0621 0.131*** 0.165***  
  (0.0384) (0.0439)  (0.0588)   
Micro-business  0.0321 0.145***    
  (0.0416) (0.0518)     
Co-specialized skills & technologies        
Ln(Experiencesubclass)  -0.0217** -0.0320***  -0.0381*** -0.0628*** 
  (0.00898) (0.0112)  (0.0143)  (0.0223) 
Ln(Technology cycle time)  -0.0678* -0.105**  -0.169**  0.188** 
  (0.0366) (0.0481)  (0.0732) (0.0844) 
Project risks        
Technology risk                   0.198***  0.285***  0.0260*** 
   (0.0397)  (0.0818)  (0.00873) 
Science  0.0304***      
  (0.00472)      
IP position        
IP confidence  0.000521 0.0359*** 0.0599***  0.0113 
  (0.00356) (0.00898)  (0.0180)  (0.00967) 
        
Constant  0.202** -0.395**  -0.617*  -0.291 
  (0.0964) (0.188)  (0.354)  (0.200) 
Hansen J Test, Chi-sq(2) P-val   0.1823     
Under-Identification, KP rk LM        
F test (tech_rsk)   21.15  18.92   
F test that all u_i=0:     F(379, 652)       2.66     
Observations  2,729 2,614  1,468  1,036 
Cases       380 
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